pression "international humanitarian law" (IHL), a term that in itself implies universality and equal application to tame the horrors of armed conflict. 6 In that vein, Meron explains that under the influence of human rights "the law of war has been changing and acquiring a more humane face: the inroads made on the dominant role of reciprocity; the fostering of accountability; the formation, formulation and interpretation of rules […]" 7 Such "humanized" humanitarian law seems to be the pinnacle of progress, the fulfilment of the ancient dream of humanity. Still, this pristine image is marred by a history of racism, exclusion, and lethal inclusion. In this paper I would like to reflect on these blemishes and examine whether international humanitarian law can move beyond its past and present to finally truly deserve such a lofty label.
The Progress of Civilisation and Racism -Unity through Exclusion
In 1868, on the proposition of Imperial Russia, the major world powers renounced for the first time in history in an international treaty the use of a particular means of warfare, explosive projectiles under the weight of 400 grammes. 8 The preamble of the St. Petersburg Declaration enunciated that 6 Solis underlines that "the conflation of LOAC/IHL terminology reflects a desire of humanitarian-oriented groups and nongovernmental organisations to avoid phrases like "law of war" in favour of more pacific terms, perhaps in the hope that battlefield actions may someday follow that description." Solis, Gary there is an "expediency of forbidding the use of certain projectiles in times of war between civilised nations" and since "the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy" the employment of weapons which "uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable" should be prohibited. This pronouncement was couched in the general telos of progress as "the progress of civilisation should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war". Three decades later, the preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention (II) asserted that:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the laws of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilised nations, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience. 9 This formulation, widely known as "Martens Clause", named after the famous Russian jurist Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens, who suggested the inclusion of a general reference to unwritten principles to resolve a diplomatic deadlock during the negotiations, 10 was restated in the preamble of the 1907 Hague Convention IV, which emphasised that it was paramount to "serve, even in this extreme case, the interest of humanity and the ever progressive needs of civilisation", 11 while a slightly modified version appeared in Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 12 was incorporated into numerous other conventions regulating the means and methods of warfare. 13 In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion) the International Court of Justice affirmed the relevance of the Martens Clause "whose continuing existence and applicability is not to be doubted" and declared that "it has proved to be an effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of military technology". 14 Today the Martens Clause is generally regarded as a reminder that even in the absence of black letter law the belligerents' freedom to resort to violence in an armed conflict is constrained by customary law and general considerations of humanity. 15 One could draw the conclusion from such references to progress, civilisation, and humanity that classical international law aimed at creating a universally applicable regulation of legitimate conduct during armed conflicts. After all, references to these noble ideals have predated the adoption of the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration and wethority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience." Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 3 (entry into force 7 December 1979). 13 See inter alia, the reference to "the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity" in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production Notwithstanding the moral rhetoric and the frequent references to universal principles, the laws of nations were deemed to apply to "civilised" nations only, to countries that shared a similar, predominantly Western and Christian culture. Consequently, outside this scope international law did not (or only to a limited extent) regulate the relationship between "civilised" and "uncivilised" countries. 17 A passage from Mill perfectly summarises this essentially racist justification of the differentiated application of international law. He argued that:
To suppose that the same international customs, and the same rules of international morality, can obtain between one civilised nation and another, and between civilised nations and barbarians, is a grave error, and one which no 16 statesman can fall into however it may be with those, who from a safe and unresponsable position, criticise statesmen. Among the many reasons why the same rules cannot be applicable to situations so different, the two following are among the most important. In the first place, the rules of ordinary international morality imply reciprocity. But barbarians will not reciprocate. They cannot be depended on for observing any rules. Their minds are not capable of so great an effort, nor their will sufficiently under the influence of distant motives. In the next place, nations which are still barbarous have not got beyond the period during which it is likely to be for their benefit that they should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners […] To characterise any conduct whatever towards a barbarous people as a violation of the law of nations, only shows that he who so speaks has never considered the subject. A violation of great principles of morality it may easily be, but barbarians have no rights as a nation, except a right to such treatment as may, at the earliest possible period, fit them for becoming one. The only moral laws for the relation between a civilised and a barbarous government are the universal rules of morality between man and man. 18 For contemporary authors, the "non-civilised", barbarous", "savage" people were biologically incapable of complying with the normative regulation of international law. They could not be placed on an equal footing with the European, civilised world but had to be controlled and civilised -forcefully, if necessary. Inevitably, they did not possess sovereignty unless to the limited extent that they had the right to transfer ownership of their land to the colonising powers. 19 sic point is that the development of the idea of sovereignty in relation to the non-European world occurs in terms of dispossession, its ability to alienate its lands and rights […] the native is granted personality in order to be bound". 20 This meant that such sovereignty was "only tenuously connected with its own identity; rather, it was artificially created in accordance with the interests and world view of Europe; it emerged from and was inextricably linked with complex of practices which were explicitly directed towards the exploitation and domination of non-European peoples". 21
To rationalize mission civilisatrice as a standard justification for colonization, 22 contemporary scholarship had to resort to biological and anthropological arguments. Analysing the works of Cambridge law professor Thomas J. Lawrence, Riles observes that texts are replete with references to the crude biological nature of the "race of savages" and the "dwarfs of the Central African forest," for example. The thrill of the racialized savage -the thrill of racism -is the thrill of catagorizing, of ordering, of controlling; and Lawrence's use of this imagery in his treatise imputed this thrill to international law […] 23
The savage was regarded subhuman and superhuman at the same time, which warranted the non-application of the law of war. The savage was subhuman since he was driven by his violent nature that resulted in a constant state of war and all kinds of moral depravities. Lawrence thus argued that: 
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War between savage tribes is marked by the unrestricted indulgence of man's fiercest passions. Conquered enemies are enslaved, or tortured, or even eaten. Whatever hatred suggests is done without stint or limit. The actual fighting is carried on in the most ferocious and bloodthirsty manner, and when it is over the vanquished are made to drain the cup of misery to the last bitter drop
At the same time, the savage apparently had a superhuman physical strength and stamina so the usual restrictions of the law of war concerning means and methods of warfare could not possibly affect colonial warfare. In a revealing episode, Great Britain supported the ban of expanding (dum-dum) bullets at the 1899 Hague Conference but made a case for an exception in colonial conflicts. The British representative, Sir John Ardagh scornfully argued that:
In civilised war a soldier penetrated by a small projectile is wounded, withdraws to the ambulance, and does not advance any further. It is very different with a savage. Even though pierced two or three times, he does not cease to march forward, does not call upon the hospital attendants, but continues on, and before anyone has time to explain to him that he is flagrantly violating the decision of the Hague Conference, he cuts off your head. 25 While the British proposition was ultimately defeated, the underlying idea that since the savages are incapable of showing restraint in warfare the law of war cannot apply to them persisted. 26 Indeed, according to a widely held view the only humane course of action in such situations was the un- [I]f a few "non-combatants" -if there be any such in native folk of this character -are killed, the loss of life is probably far less than might have been sustained in prolonged operations of a more polite character. The inhuman act thus becomes actually humane, for it shortens the conflict and prevents the shedding of more excessive quantities of blood. 28 According to this view, while the dictates of human decency and the requirement of maintaining military discipline could still result in the enforcement of some rules of the law of armed conflict, 29 ultimately it was within the discretion of the military commanders to determine which norms they wished to adhere to. 30 The idea of Western superiority has lost all intellectual currency by the end of World War II and Article 1 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations explicitly prescribed "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion" as one of the purposes of the United Nations. 31 The savage may have no longer "provided the symbolic counterpoint to […] [the] ordering functions of international law' 32 but the universal application of the law of armed conflict was still not accomplished.
Lack of Universality -The Distinction between International and NonInternational Armed Conflicts The Regulation of Insurgency and Belligerency
Before the Second World War, international law focused on the regulation of inter-state violence and consequently generally regarded civil wars as falling into the domaine réservé of sovereign states. Classical international law literature used a spate of different expressions to denote internal conflicts, inter alia riot, mob violence, insurrection, disturbances, rebellion, commotion etc. The legal significance of this differing terminology, however, seemed to be uncertain at best. 33 The rules of the laws of armed conflict only became applicable when the state accorded recognition of insurgency or belligerency to the rebels, accepting them as equal belligerents. 
Tamás Hoffmann
The main difference between insurgency and belligerency was the scope of corresponding rights. While insurgency was merely a provisional classification, which would arise merely to settle problems arising from de facto control of territory by rebels, 35 recognition of belligerency created a formal status involving rights and duties, since each of the parties had the right to exercise belligerent rights such as search of ships on the high seas, seizure of contraband and confiscation of ships running and effective blockade. 36 Moreover, by recognising the rebels as belligerents, the government was putting them "under an obligation to respect the customs of war against its own forces, and at the same time freeing itself from any responsibility for acts committed by the recognised belligerents". 37 Even though recognition of belligerency was claimed to be based on facts, 38 the distinction between insurgency and belligerency was still uncertain. Legal opinion varied about the consequences of the recognition of insurgency and about the necessity of the recognition of belligerency to bring about the application of the full gamut of the laws of war. 39 In theory, recognition of belligerency was obligatory in case the conditions were fulfilled, however, in reality "the imprecision of the criteria left 35 Green defined insurgency as "a condition or status in which organized bodies of men are in a state of armed hostility against the established government for public political purposes. It is something more than mere riot. Insurgency status is attained when the insurgent movement has become an actual threat to the continuation of the established government and succeeded in interrupting normal foreign intercourse between the legitimate government and foreign 
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the legal government discretion to decide whether or not to recognise the existence of conflict." 40 At the end of the day, recognition of belligerency was a decision largely based on policy considerations, 41 such as the desire to escape responsibility for the acts of the insurgents or, in the interests of humanity, to avoid cruelties and reprisals 42 and the perceived lack of effectiveness of insurgents was regularly invoked as a convenient justification for refusal to accord belligerent status. 43 
The Distinction between International and Non-International Armed Conflicts
After 1945, due to the desuetude of the regime of recognition of belligerency and drawing on the horrors of the Spanish Civil War, the inevitability of the regulation of internal hostilities became evident. To remedy this gap in legal regulation, Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions was adopted as a revolutionary new piece of international legislation. 44 The Article represents an uneasy compromise between the humanitarians seeking to extend the full body of international humanitarian law to internal conflicts and those attempting to preserve the sovereign rights of states. 45 It appears with identical text in all four of the Geneva Conventi- ons and constitutes a completely separate entity from the other provisions, a "Convention in miniature". 46 Even though its text contains only a series of rudimentary provisions dealing with minimum rights and obligations in case of an "armed conflict not of an international character", 47 it was hailed by the International Court of Justice as the expression of "elementary considerations of humanity", which are applicable in all armed conflicts. 48 However, the definition of "armed conflict not of an international character" is conspicuously missing from the text. 
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A few years after the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Convention, Pictet submitted that Common Article 3 should have an extremely wide scope of application, extending it to virtually every single instance of violence by appealing to humanitarian considerations. 50 However, the travaux prépa-ratoires reveal that during the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, most states wished to set a very high threshold of application for Common Article 3. The US delegation, for instance, emphasised that insurgents must possess a state-like structure, similar to the classic conditions of recognition of belligerency. 51 Correspondingly, the Australian 52 and Canadian 53 delegations submitted similar proposals. 54 It can be concluded that the drafters conceived the term "armed conflict not of an international character" to refer to "situations of civil war, i.e. non-international armed conflict reaching the threshold of intensity associated with contemporaneous conventional international warfare." 55 In practice, states usually denied the existence of a non-international armed conflict, even in exceptionally serious internal conflicts, to avoid conferring a legitimate status to rebels. During the 1954-1962 Algerian War of Independence, France never officially recognised that the "rebellion" had reached the threshold of an armed conflict and treated the conflict as a law-enforcement situation 56 even is so often the case with humanitarian law instruments, this is the outcome of the desire for maximum width for the play of the humanitarian norms, overriding the desire for that element of certainty which legal norms demand if they are to be effective. 57 This consistent practice of non-recognition of the existence of an armed conflict in colonial wars has effectively recreated the former -allegedly abolished differentiation concerning conflicts between civilised and noncivilised people. Yet, it must be admitted that the newly independent former colonies were quite glad to maintain the dichotomy between international and non-international armed conflicts and certainly not too eager to extend the protection of international humanitarian law to insurgents fighting against their rule.
By the 1990s the conventional framework of international humanitarian law only gave a skeletal regulation of non-international armed conflicts 58 and the existence of any customary rules pertaining to the regulation of means and methods of warfare beyond the scope of treaty provisions was generally denied. 59 In 1995, however, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) issued a ground-breaking judgment which stated that there exists a wide range of customary norms applicable to non-international armed conflicts and defined the scope of application 
of these rights. In the Tadić jurisdiction case the Appeals Chamber submitted that "an armed conflict exists whenever there is […] protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State". 60 This definition has generally been accepted as a restatement of customary international law, consistently reiterated by the ICTY, 61 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 62 the International Criminal Court, 63 internationalised criminal courts, 64 military law manuals 65 and international expert reports. 66 The cu-stomary status of the Tadić definition is also buttressed by its inclusion in Article 8 (2) (f) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 67 While this decision arguably amounted to judicial law-making, today it is generally accepted that the majority of the norms applicable to international armed conflicts now also extend to non-international armed conflicts. 68 Judge Cassese summarized this phenomenon the following way:
[T]here has been a convergence of two bodies of international law with the result that internal strife is now governed to a large extent by the rules and principles which had traditionally only applied to international conflicts. […] regarding the formation of customary international law rules to protect those who are not taking part in hostilities, […] this convergence has come about due largely to the following factors: (1) the increase in the number of civil conflicts; (2) the increase in the level of cruelty of internal conflicts; (3) the increasing interdependence of States; (4) the influence of universal human rights standards. The Appeals Chamber then turned to the extension of the rules regarding methods and means of warfare to internal armed conflicts and concluded that a similar blurring had occurred. In short, certain norms apply as customary international law to internal and international conflicts alike. 69 This remarkable transformation of international humanitarian law is aptly demonstrated by the Customary Law Study of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 70 The ICRC Study attempts to authoritatively identify the customary norms of humanitarian law and found that most rules of international humanitarian law are now equally applicable in inter-national and non-international armed conflicts alike. 71 Still, even though there have been suggestions for eliminating this dichotomy, 72 a complete unification of the two fields seems to be unrealistic. Some rules pertaining to international conflict would be ill-fit to a non-international armed conflict. It is obvious that the rules of occupation cannot be completely applied to civil wars as the regulation of occupation is based on the notion of temporary administration of a territory without the infringements of sovereign rights. It is difficult to imagine how that could be applied in its entirety to an internal conflict, for instance the injunctions against changing existing laws or the dismissal of members of the public administration.
Still, some countries have effectively abolished the distinction between different legal regimes on the ground. For instance, the armed forces of the United States 73 and Germany 74 apply the rules of international humanitarian law irrespective of the type of conflict. Similarly, the Canadian Armed Forces apply in such manner the "spirit and principles" of humanitarian law. 75 Yet, while this regulation reflects policy considerations to ensure the respect of international humanitarian law to the fullest possible extent, these countries still maintain the traditional dichotomy with regard to the determination of combatant status, clearly rejecting to grant combatant immunity to insurgents.
Universal Application of International Humanitarian Law as an AbuseEqual Application of Law in Asymmetric Conflicts
Before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, states usually denied the applicability of international humanitarian law to the fight against terrorism. 76 Terrorism was generally dealt within the framework of criminal regulation. Still, it seems that the unprecedented magnitude of the 11 September terrorist acts has fundamentally changed the legal framework concerning this issue. President George W. Bush made an oral "declaration of war" on Al Qaeda 77 and according to the official American doctrine even though the worldwide hostilities with the terrorist group were regulated by jus in bello, the persons participating in terrorist organisations could not enjoy the protection of the Geneva Conventions. 78 The US Department of Defense evaluated the situation as follows:
The current conflict is not an international war between Nation States, but rather a conflict between a Nation State and a non-governmental organisation. At the same time, the current conflict is not a civil war under Article 3, because it is a conflict of "an international character" rather than an internal armed conflict between parties contending for control over a government or a territory. 79 This global war on terror represents a completely new approach to tackling the problem of terrorism by extending the material scope of application of international humanitarian law. 80 Even though the existence of a "state of war" could have significance under US domestic law, potentially explaining such categorisation by the US leadership, 81 the use of legal semantics 82 was an opportunistic attempt to exploit the normative framework of the law of war. In contrast to earlier fears that the recognition of the existence of a non-international armed conflict could confer status to non-state armed groups, the US administration realised that the norms of armed conflicts -especially those concerning the conduct of hostilities -in an asymmetric conflict inevitably favour the state that possesses a more organised armed force and more advanced technology. 83 plained that "In today's reality, a terrorist organization is likely to have consider- In such a situation the recognition of a non-international armed conflict and the concomitant use of international humanitarian law actually has much more severe repercussions for members of a non-state armed group than designating them as criminal and allow human rights law to create limitations for the use of violence. As Dinstein emphasises "in a civil war there is always the built-in distinction between combatants who fight for the central (constitutionally legal) Government and those who rise against it. The latter are viewed as traitors […]". 84 Consequently, members of non-state armed groups do not enjoy combatant privileges even if they fully comply with the rules of international humanitarian law and can be prosecuted for mere participation in an armed conflict. On the other hand, they can be targeted (so state forces do not have the obligation to arrest them) 85 and upon capture possibly detained for an undefined period of time with limited judicial oversight. 86 This is how the dream of universal application of international humanitarian law has grotesquely been fulfilled: We (the states) now acknow-ledge that you (terrorist/savage etc.) are fighting an armed conflict with us, so give up everything that defended you (such as the lack of distinction from the civilian population) and prepare to die in a fair fight (for instance in a drone strike launched by an operator from another continent)! The ultimate irony is that the progressive jurisprudence of the international criminal fora behind the "humanization" of humanitarian law was guided by a belief that expanding the scope of application of the law of armed conflict will result in ever greater protection. However, the judges seemed to have forgotten that the expansion of international humanitarian law, whose rules were created by a desire to balance military necessity with concerns for humanity, could "crowd out" human rights law, which on the other hand is focusing on the protection of the individual against the state. 87 And this is how the promise of protection has become the promise of destruction…
Conclusion -The Promise of International Humanitarian Law
The law of war was originally not created to realise humanitarian aspirations. Even though Lauterpacht forcefully argued that "its purpose is almost entirely humanitarian in the literal sense of the word, namely to prevent or mitigate suffering and, in some cases, to rescue life from the savagery of battle and passion", 88 Jochnick and Normand convincingly contend that the codification of jus in bello was in many respects originally primarily a recognition of systemic factors existing independently of legal regulation. 89 Humanity in war originally referred to the need to use Every means that is calculated to shorten the war constitutes the most humane policy to follow. When the most ruthless measures are considered best calculated to lead us to victory, and a swift victory […] they must be employed. 91 Today, however, international humanitarian law is no longer dependent on reciprocity, the si omnes (general application) clauses no longer vitiate the application of humanitarian treaties and the rules concerning the protection of the victims of war are characterised by strict, non-derogable prohibitions. Yet, the regulation of the conduct of hostilities, such as targeting rules employing vaguely worded principles still creates a playing field which enables powerful states to use the normative framework to their own advantage and could hardly deserve to be called humanitarian. 92 From a sociological point of view, this is exacerbated by the fact that due to the complex and technical regulatory framework of international humanitarian law general international lawyers usually tended to neglect this field. O'Donoghue explains that:
This specialisation is in part driven by the dominance of certain forms of legal expertise, in particular, the military and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The military, for obvious reasons, has a particular perspective and focus on IHL and further, has the resources necessary to command a complete understanding of all its rules. Similarly, the ICRC, with its competence driven by IHL treaty law, maintains a complete expertise. While military and ICRC opinion may not always correlate, their knowledge and competence, which extends to understanding all the rules of IHL, makes it 90 The celebrated Lieber Code, for instance, pronounced in paragraph 15 that "the more vigorously wars are pursued, the better it is for humanity. [A] few scholars argue that both "law of war" and "law of armed conflict", are passé terms, replaced in the eyes of some internationalists by "international humanitarian law", passing over the irony how a body of law defining how noncombatants may lawfully be killed (i.e., collateral damage) is "humanitarian"." Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict, p. 22.
difficult for those outside this realm to compete without being dismissed as ignorant of the entirety of the law and therefore not competent to comment. 93 Nevertheless, international humanitarian law is not beyond redemption. The general principles that until today served as a means to further state interest can become a site for contestation and used to restrict violence in armed conflict. 94 If general international lawyers discover international humanitarian law and start to challenge old orthodoxies, maybe the old dream of equal protection in warfare will finally come to fruition. 
